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Alternative forms of external finance for developing countries
have increased in importance in recent years. This paper identi-
fies research that could help official creditors define their role in
a world with increased capital mobility  - and would be consis-
tent with their increased emphasis on developing the private
sector.
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Claessens identifies several gaps in the literature  markets, under the constraint that capital in the
on extemal financing for developing countries.  host country is mobile. Rc oearchers could
Theoretical and empirical research in three areas  investigate how international firms should
could help the World Bank and other official  finance (and have been financing) themselves
creditors define their role in a world with in-  and whether there have been shifts in these
creased capital mobility - and would be consis-  patterns; develop contracts that deal with prob-
tent with their increased emphasis on developing  lems of moral hazard and sovereign risk; and
the private sector. The three areas are:  discuss the multinational corporation's  interme-
T  The differences in country risk between  diation role and the possible restrictions a
alternative  forms of externalfinancing  ("alter-  government should impose on private-to-private
nativefinancing")  and traditionalfinancing.  financing.
This research would help assess the type and  Current literature does not offer official
amounts of alternative financing consistent with  creditors much analytical support about the
an (explicit or implicit) enforcement of contracts  preferred forms of financial intermediation or
and the institutiens needed to assure the proper  their -ossible support role for private sector
treatment of claims.  financ.  ag (cofinancing, guarantees, privatization,
- Incentive structures for,  and restrictions on,  and how to get comfortable  adherence to private-
alternative  financing in the host country. Re-  to-private claims).  Official creditors may have
search could focus on the efficiency of these  trouble defining their roles when they don't  have
schemes from the country's perspective, and  a clear idea of the differences between alterna-
could identify the best incentive structures for  live financing and traditional financing, don't
attracting the desired amount and type of foreign  know when one or the other is called for, or the
capital. This would help countries design better  implicit seniority status of different claims.
policies on domestic regulations, taxes, account-  Research in these three areas would help
ing, institutions, and performnance  incentives.  improve official creditors' policy advice, their
Research should address such issues as the  efficiency as intermediators, and any activities
appropriateness of ownership and capital con-  associated with private-to-private lending. The
trols, the enforcement of private-to-private  World Bank and other creditor institutions are
contracts, the monitoring of external private-to-  often involved in policy advice on domestic
private contracts, the decision to allow foreign  reforms often aimed largely at attracting foreign
banks to enter a country, the design of appropri-  finance - either by developing appropriate
ate financial instrumcnts, and the appropriateness  instruments or by providing enough comfort so
of investment incentives.  that countries can adhere to performance require-
* Optimal  participation modes of interna-  ments on projects. They cannot afford to dupli-
tionalfirms in developing countries. This  cate systems that already exist and need to take
research could focus on the (optimal) capital  into account specific situations in developing
structure of a multinational corporation seeking  countries.
financing from domestic and foreign capital
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6.  References  30ALTERNATIVE  FORMS  OF EXTERNAL  FINANCE:  A SURVEY
1.  INTRODUCTIONI
In the eighties  many developing  countries  had to make major corrections  in their external
balances, associated  with cuts in domestic investinent,  in response to drastic reductions  in net
voluntary  commercial  bank lending. After a decade of unsuccessful  attempts to restore growth
through concerted, involuntary  provisions of new money by commercial  banks, the accepted
policy for managing  the external  debt problems  of most developing  countries is, among  others,
through  commercial  bank and official debt reduction. 2 The expectation  of most participants  is
that voluntary lending by commercial  banks to governments  for balance  of payments  purposes
will not be forthcoming in the near future for those countries that have engaged in or are
possible  candidates for debt reduction (and only in limited  amounts for most other countries).
The main sources for sovereign  lending (lending to the pub'ic sector) will be official creditors
and multilateral  institutions  and net transfers  from commercial  banks to developing  countries  will
be sharply negative.
Net transfers fro.n the public sector of developing  countries (to commcrcial  banks) has
raised the importance  of forms of external finance alternative to lending to the public sector
(balance  of payments  lending and other forms)  We use here the phrase "alternative finance"
(AF) to capture all the forms of external financing  outside  the public sector. Financing  to the
public sector is called "traditional finance" (TF). AF thus includes foreign direct investment
(FDI), project lending, portfolio investment, closed-end  equity funds, private non-guaranteed
debt, licensing, joint ventures, quasi-equity  contracts, and other forms of private-to-private
lending. 3 For the group of Severely  Indebted  Middle Income Countries (SIMICs) 4 more than
60 percent of net resource  flows was already from AF sources  in 1989  and this share is expected
to increase  in coming years. Similar trends exist for other groups of countries (see for instance
World Bank 1990/1991).
AF is likely to take on an increased importance for a number of reasons. First, the
experience  of successful  developing  countries  shows that TF is being substituted  by AF as the
country develops. This indicates that future financing to other developing countries will also
' I would  like to thank Jonathan Eaton, Donald Lessard, Lemma  Senbet, George Anayiotos,  Harry Huizinga,
Ishac Diwan, Sweder van Wijnbergen,  Vikram Nehru, Guy Pfeffermann,  participants in a Bank seminar, and
anonymous  referees for helpful  comments  and contributions.
2 There  exists conflicting  empirical  evidence  regarding  the existence  of a debt overhang  and the resulting  need
for debt relief. See for instance  IMF (1989)  and Hofman  and Reisen  (1990) for two  different findings.
3 Since FDI has represented  and will likely represent the largest component  of AF, we rely mostly on FDI
numbers  for the quantitative  section (Section  2 of this paper).  The paper covers, however,  all forms of AF.
' This group includes: Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Egypt,
Honduras,  Hungary, Mexico, Morocco,  Nicaragua,  Peru, Philippines,  Poland, Senegal,  Uruguay  and Venezuela.
See further  Table Al in Global Economic  Prospects  (1991).have to be different from the past. 5 Second, many developing  countries are opening up their
markets, privatizing, and reforming their economies.  These countries will have economic
systems not unlike some of the OECD countries, have more developed domestic financial
systems, and, most importantly,  have different roles of the state. At the same time, however,
many of these countries will face a (external and internal) claim overhang. Financing in this
situation  will have to look different  from the past. Third, and related, point is that the opening
up of these economies  means  that local capital  will increasingly  be exposed  to competition  from
abroad. Since domestic  capital will be internationally  mobile capital, linkages between  external
and internal finance will become more important. AF is  more likely appropriate in  such
circumstances  since with AF the external  to internal  linkage  is direct, whereas with TF it is only
via the government.  Fourthly, AF can have important added benefits such as risk-sharing
features, performance incentives, and linkages with developed countries' goods and capital
markets, which makes it more attractive to both the country and the capital provider. Lastly,
there can be important spill-over  effects of AF on the development  process of a country, e.g.
through  transfer of new technology.  The new growth literature has drawn more attention  to the
importance of these spill-over effects, and thus to AF, which often comes as a package of
capital, technology,  and know-how.
From the World Bank's point of view, AF is important for a number of additional
reasons. Firstly,  most middle-income  countries will need access to  AF  to  support their
resumption  of sustainable  economic  growth. With a decline  in TF, the importance  of AF, both
in aggregate  and in terms of their impact  on the country's development  process (and also on the
Bank's exposure), is  significant.  Secondly, while these flows involve private-to-private
financing, they may require international institutional support. This can be in the form of
developing  the necessary domestic environment  for these instruments--as  through the Bank's
work on domestic financial  restructurings, liberalization,  foreign investment policies, reform
process, tax policies, etc.--or in the form of the development  of new financial instruments  or
through  providing the necessary  comfort at the project level or sovereign  level.
The increased impertance  of AF from the Bank's and countries' point of view raises a
number questions like: wh.  k'termines these flows; what is the importance  of country risk
factors; how can these flowf  ,.  influenced  and increased;  and how can they be put to their best
use. However, the tools to an4wer  these  questions  are lacking  since relatively  little  analytical  and
empirical research has been done on AF in recent years. This is an area where much of the
major research effort was undertaken  in the 1960s  and 1970s;  most recent research on external
financing  has been concentrated  on sovereign  debt. 6 This is partly a reflection of the fact that
the (real) value of AF did not increase  over the period 1970  till mid-  1980s  while the (real) value
of lending  did increase  (it grew at rates close to 10%  during the 19-Os  in real terms). Transfers
on lending  dominated  those  on AF during the 1980s. As a result, much of the analytically  based
This also means  that  a 'black  box' approach,  as often  used for sovereign  debt  analysis,  wil not suffice  for
analyzing  the sustainability  and  country  risks  aspects  of AF.
d The gaps  in the literature  are large.  For example,  in the  World  Development  Report  (WDR) 1989  only one
page  was devoted  to external  financial  policy. Lessard  and  Williamson  (1985) and  WDR 1985  still represent  the
most  comprehensive  surveys.3
research on AF dates before 1980.  Furthermore, the earlier literature dwelt largely on the
underlying motivations for capital transfers (call them "real"  facors)  and  less of  it  was
specificdlly  concerned  with the impact  and nature  of country risk aspects.  Even though issues
such as political  risks and expropriation  were of course discussed, this was rarely done using
analytical models. In contrast, TF research, which has increased dramatically over the last
decade, concentrated  on sovereign risk (the "sovereign" factors). Underlying motivations  for
capital transfers to developing  countries (the "real" factors) were most often assumed in this
literature instead of explicitly modelled. In practice, both real and country risks factors wvill
influence  TF as well as AF.
The main purpose of this paper is to survey  the existing literature  on AF and indicate the
major research  gaps. In this way, the survey  may help  to identify  the factors  influencing  the flow
of AF, provide analytical--  and empirically  supported--underpinnings  for policy work and for an
assessment  of the amounts likely to be available.  The focus of this survey is on aspects of
country  risks related  to AF and the dispute  settlement  of international  claims (where it discusses
the value of the sovereign risk analysis of TF for the analysis of AF), domestic incentive
schemes,  to attract foreign financing,  the intermediation  role of multinational  firms and banks,
and the supply  side of AF. The survey thus  investigates  the incentives  for individuals  and firms;
only where necessary,  aggregate  implications  are taken into account. 7
The outline  of this survey is as follows. Section  2 provides  some descriptive  statistics  cf
AF and niakes a comparison  with TF.  Section 3 identifies  the key chatacteristics  in which AF
differs from TF. Section  4 first briefly  reviews  the factors  motivating  capital flows. This section
next identifies  the extent to which TF and AF differ in the factors motivating  capital flows and
to what extent the implications  of these differences  have been explored  in the literature so far.
Section  5 summarizes  the survey  and section 6 provides the references.
' The survey  focuses  less on the motivations  for foreign  investment  identified  in the literature,  (such as firm
specific  advantages,  internalization  of advantages,  multiplants  versus multifirms  versus  multicountry  firms)  and
occasionally  assumes  that  the  basic  motivations  for foreign  investment  exist.4
2.  A BRIEF  OVERVIEW  OF  SOME  KEY ASPECTS  OF  ALTERNATIVE  FORMS
OF EXTERNAL  FINANCE
To set the stage for a discussion  of AF, we present first some (aggregate) statistics  on
AF and TF, and highlight some of the similarities  and differences  between patterns of TF and
AF. The statistics  will confirm the relevance  of the distinctions  made in section 3 and provide
the background  for the survey of section 4. We divide AF into three categories: foreign  direct
investment;  equity portfolio  investment  (including  country funds); and private, non-guaranteed
debt. We start with some  aggregate statistics  on FDI flows and stocks, since tDI  has been the
largest among  the AF, and will compare these numbers to public external debt. 8
I.  FDI
Even though substantia!  differences  exist among individual  devwioping  countries, some
general patterns  emerge. Stocks  of FDI are in general lower  than debt stocks. 9 The total aiinunt
of FDI claims in 1988 on all developing  countries was approximately  11 percent of the total
amount of debt claims. The average  ratio of FDI stocks to GNP (FDI/GNP) of all developing
countries  was orly 10%, while the average  debt to GNP ratio (DOD/GNP)  is 83%. FDI/GNP
exceeds DOD/GNP  for only a few developing  countries (e.g., in 1988 only for Botswana  and
Trinidad  and the suspicion  is that the data were unreliable  in those  cases). The standard  deviation
in FDI/GNP across countries is also much less than the standard deviation  in r  )D/GNP; in
1988 the standard  deviation in the ratios was 13% versus 68%.io  The maximum  FDI/GNP is
47%, the maximum  DOD/GNP  is 450%. The coefficient  of variation was however  much larger
for FDI/GNP than for DOD/GNP, 1.35 versus 0.822, indicating  that relatively speaking  there
was more variation in the ratio of FDI to GDP.
FDI stocks tend to be concentrated  in a small number of developing countries. For
instance, more than 63 percent of the total stock  of FDI claims in developing  countries was in
5 countries (Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, Malaysia and China), whereas these 5 countries only
accounted  for 28 percent of total debt claims on developing  countries. In contrast, the top 5
borrowers in debt (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, India and Indonesia) accounted for only 33
8 We will argue in section 3 that this is not necessasy  a sensible  comparison  from an economic  point of view.
The purpose  here is just to indicate  the absolute  and relative  magnitude  of both measures  and indicate  some salient
differences.
9 Reliable  numbers  on FDI stocks  are difficult  to obtain, partly  because  of probiems  with  data but also because
it is difficult  to calculate  the market  value  of FDI. The method  used here was to sum over time  the net annual FDI
flows (from the OECD data bank) from the earliest  year data were available  (generally  around 1965). The data
obtained  were largely consistent  with those reported  by other sources  (which  may use the same method),  such as
the US Department  of Commerce  and the IMF. 'Non-bona fide' developing  countries,  which often merely  serve
as conduit  for FDI to developed  countries, such as Netherlands  Antilles,  are excluded.  See also IFC (1989).
'° It should  be remembered  that  for some  developing  countries  FDI/GNP  was actually  negative  (e.g. Venezuela),
increasing  the standard  deviation.  Developing  countries  which  are net creditors  on account  of debt are excluded.percent of total debt stocks, or half of the share of total FDI of the top 5 FDI-countries."
Some similarities  exist among the countries  with relatively high amounis of FDI claims (such
as a broad natural resource base and a large domestik market). However, these similarities
cannot easily be.  generaiized  since several countries  with such characteristics  do not have large
amounts of Fri  stocks (e.g., India and Indonesia).
FDI flows to developing  countries have come almost entirely from a  small group of
developed  countries and there is little intra-developing  country FDI flow.  The largest direct
investors  in developing  countries  are companies  from United  States, United Kingdom,  Germany,
Japan and France.
FDI flows  consist  of new  equity, retairned  earnings  and intercompany  loans. It is not clear
what determines  the division  between these three components  and there has been great variation
in the relative contributions  of these three components." 2
The external debt of a country tends  to be closely related  to its per capita income. This
run. counter to the view that, since  marginal rates of return are higher in low per capita income
countries, foreign capital should flow relatively more to low per capita income countries, and
that therefore debt stocks per capita should be relatively higher for low per capita income
countries (see Gertler and Rogoff (1989)). A similar positive relationship  also holds for per
capita FDI and GNP. In fact, across countries  FDI per capita tends to be even more sensitive
with respect to GNP per capita than DOD per capita is. For example, the elasticity  of FDI per
capita (FDI/CAP) with respect to GNP per capita (GNP/CAP)  across developing  countries is
much higher than the elasticity  of DOD per capita (DOD/CAP)  with respect to GNP/CAP. For
1988 the elasticity of FDI/CAP with respect to GNP/CAP was 1.5 while the elasticity for
DOD/CAP was only 0.84.13 Similar results for the magnitudes  of the elasticities  are obtained
for other years, across (regional) groups of countries, and for individual  countries over time
(even though in the last case, the explanatory  power is, of course, limited).' 4
" These 5 countries account  for 47 percent of total FDI stocks, but the top two (Mexico and Brazil)  account
together  for 38 percent. The share of an individual  country  of the total world FDI stock and the share of the total
debt stock are closely correlated  (R2=0.83).
12 For examiple,  during the 1980s  the share of intercomvany  transactions  among  parent  and affiliate  companies
of multinational  firms as a proportion of total FDI flows exhibited  significant  variation. In addition, these three
components  have  at times moved  in opposite  directions. For example,  total  FDI flows for the USA varied  between
an inflow  of $2.4 billion  in 1982  to an outflow  of $44.5 billion  in 1987.  Equity capital has varied from an inflow
of $2.2 billion  in 1985  to an outflow  of $9.7 billion  in 1982.  Reinvested  earnings  have varied  between  an outflow
of $1.4 bilion in 1982  to an outflow  of $35.7 billion  in 1987  and intercompany  debt has varied between  an inflow
of $13.4 bilion in 1982  to an outflow  of $1.3 billion  in 1985.
13 The explanatory  power is quite good, R 2 is generally above .50 for FDI/CAP and is around .65 for
DOD/CAP  on GNP/CAP.
'4  The close correlation  between  debt as well as FDI levels  and GDP does, of course, not indicate  the nature
of the causality:  whether  external  capital leads  to higher  GDP (growth)  or whether  higher GDP (growth)  allows  for
a larger amount  of external  capital. See further Caves (1983), Chapter 9 for a critical overview of studies  of this
relationship.6
Countries with debt servicing difficulties had significantly  lower FDI/GNP ratios and
significantly  higher DOD/GNP ratios, before thieir  debt servi ing problems  occurred.' 5 Also,
non-SIMICs  as a group relied relatively more on FDI as a sou-ce of external financing  during
the period 1976-1981.
Defaults  on debt  do not necessaiily  coincide  with defaults  on FDI and vice-versa.  In fact,
countries  have seldom defaulted  (explicitly)  on their external debt and FDI claims at the same
time.  Creditors and investors have considered  defaults on debt and FDi as manifestations  of
sovereign  risks which are largely separable. Several developing  countries expropriated  FDI in
the 1960s  and 1970s. 16 At the same time, creditors were willing to provide the same countries
with large amounts of  credit. In the  1980s, the opposite happened; when many countries
defaulted  on debt de facto, only a few countries expropriated  FDI.'
Large amounts of FDI or credit have not flowed to developing countries at the same
time. Either FDI or credit tended  to dominate  at different  points in time. For example, external
financing  to developing  countries in the second half of the 1930s was largely characterized  by
debt-creating  flows;  while the 1950s  were dominated  by large amounts of FDI. In tie  1970s,
of course, loans were predominawitly  used, and the real value of debt-creating  finance increased
by about 10% a year.  The real value of FDI flows on the other hand did not change between
1967 and 1982.
The cost of servicing  FDI is in general higher than the cost of serving debt. The rate of
return on U.S. FDI in developing  countries  (the only developed  country for which detailed  data
are available)  over the period 1Q80-1986  was 16.2%.18  Considerable  differences  existed among
individual  countries  and country groupings:  Latin America's rate was the lowest (12.2%) and
Asia's the highest  (28.5%). As a comparison,  the rate of return on FDI in developed  countries
over the same period was 12.2%. This could also be compared  to the average cost on debt from
commercial  sources  during the period 1980 to 1986 for developing  countries which was 9.7. %.
The rates of return on FDI are in general positively  related to the host country's exports
and GDP growth rates.  The relationship  between international  interest rates and developing
;5  Again, the nature  of the causality  is unknown  since relatively  higher PDI/GNP  ratios and lower DOD/GNP
ratios can equally  well be interpreted  as ex-ante  indicators  of the prospects  of the country, and thus the likelihood
of debt servicing problems, as they can be interpreted  as mechanisms  which ex-post prevented debt servicing
problems  from occurring.
16  Approximately  20% of the value of all FDI carried out between 1956 and 1972 was expropriated  without
compensation  in this period (see Williams  (1975)).
7 It can be argued  that the value to the country  of expropriating  FDI claims  has declined in the 1980s  since the
costs (and  corresponding  opportunity  value)  of servicing  the FDI claims  has declined  as profitability  has fallen.  This
can however  only be partly correct  since the opportunity  costs of not expropriating  must have risen in periods of
shortage of foreign  exchange. Possibly, linkages  between  the two types of default  occur because of the domestic
political  system.
I8  Calculated  as the direct-investment  .elated payments  (i.e., dividend  and interest plus reinvested  earnings)  as
a percentage  of the estimated  stock  of direct investment  outstanding  (obtained  from US Department  of Commerce).7
countries' growth rates of exports and GDP has been insignificant  oi negative.
Countries with higher FDI/GNP ratios tend to have higher domestic real interest rates
and countries  with higher  DOD/GNP  ratios tend  to have  !  Jwer (negative)  real interest  rates. This
may indicate  that there exist a link between  the structure  and efficiency  of the domestic  financial
system and the type of external financing  that is attracted. It relates to the observation  made
earlier that FDI/GNP and DOD/GNP iatios for countries with and without debt servicirig
difficulties  differed,  since the relationship  between  real interest rates, growth, and debt servicing
problems  is well documented  (see Gelb (1989)  and WDR 1989).
II.  Equity  Portfolio Investment"
Foreign investors have directly invested only small amounts in  the stock rilarkets  of
developing countries (through the acquisition of  up to  10% of the shares of an individual
company). Tne largest portfolio  investments  have been made indirectly through the use of so-
called country  funds. The total net asset value of country funds invested  in developing  countries
in 1989 is estimated to be $7 billion. The investments  are concentrated in a few developing
countries  (particularly  the Newly Industrializing  Economies  (NIEs), 20 see further IFC (1990)).
These funds represent about 2% of  the total stock market capitalization of all developing
countries (estimated  to be $400 billion at end-1989  or 4% of the capitalization  of developed
stock markets)."
Dollar rates of return on developing  countries' equities  tend to be high, but volatile. The
IFC composite  rate of return on developing  country  equity over 1984-1989  was 25.7%, or 2.5
percentage points above an index of  world equity markets (the Morgan-Stanley Capital
International  Index). Rates of return for developing  countries tend to be more volatile than for
the world equity index.  Rates of return also tend to have a low correlation with the rates of
return in developed  country markets (on the order of -.1 to .3).22
mI.  Private Non-Guaranteed Debt
Data are less easily available in other forms of AF.  Many developing  countries do not
keep data on non-guaranteed  debt incurred  by private companies  and creditor countries  often  do
not even make the distinction between the two.  OECD data on funds raised by developing
countries  in the form of bond issues and other capital market instruments  (such as commercial
paper programs, some non-underwritten  facilities  and other backup facilities)  include public as
'9 On  equity  portfolio  investments,  a relatively  large  information  is available,  especially  on country  funds  (see
for  instance  van  Agtmeal  (1984)  and  the  Emerging  Capital  Markets  Handbooks  of the  IFC, 1989  and  1990  editions).
I  This group  includes: Hong Kong,  Korea,  Singapore  and  Taiwan.
21 The total  market  capitalization  is heavily  concentrated  in a few countries.  Korea  and  Taiwan,  for example,
together  account  for 57%  of the market  capitalization  of all developing  countries.
2 See Diwan and Galindez  (1991).8
well as private issues.  For example, the total amount of such flows was $7 billion in 1990.23
These forms of finance have increased in absolute  and relative amounts, in part because many
developing  countries have liberalized  private sector (and sone state-enterprise)  borrowing.
The $7 billion total of private and public issues compares to gross debt creating flows
to developing  countries of $26 billion in 1990.  This $7 billion figure, however, includes forms
of finance  which are general obligaticrs of the governments  or state enterprises. Genuinely  AF
(bonds  with equity  warrants, shares  and private, non-guaranteed  obligations)  account  for a much
smaller percent of total fuk  As  ra:sed by developing  countries.
On a stock  basis, it is estimated  that total private, non-guaranteed  debt claims are about
$150 billion, or only about 11%  of public  and publicly-guaranteed  claims of $1350 billion of all
developing  countries (1990 figures).
3  Of this, international  backup  facilities  mmitments  by banks  to underwrite  instruments  that  cannot direcdy
be placed) amount to about $1.7 billion (in gross terms, not subtracting facilities used in the context  of debt
reschedulings  and  including  South  Korea).9
3.  DIFFERENCES SETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS O'F
EX  lERNAL  FINANCE
The aggregate  statistics  of section  2 indicate  that there are substantial  differences  between
the amounts and distribution of TF and AF and the rates of return they earr- in developing
countries. The type  of external  finance  and the country's economic  performance  are also closely
related. The first step to sharpen  the analysis is tc identify  where and how TF and Air differ.
For those aspects in which TF and AF are similar, policy recommendations  can build on the
stock of knowledge  on TF. To the extent they differ, new tools for analysis, management  and
forecasting  will be necessary.
TF and AF differ in the following  wavs (the differences  may overlap to some extent):
I)  Private ,ersus public obligation;
II)  Differen' type of obligation  and source of capital;
III)  Different  purpose of capital transfer;
IV)  Different  links among  capital providers and among capital receivers;and
V)  Different  links between projects and capital providers.
We will first expand  on each of these differences,  and then in the next section indicate
the possible  implications.
I.  Private versus Public Obligation
TF involves a public (or publicly-guaranteed)  obligation  and AF involves  private (non-
recourse) obligations.  The distinction  is important in many respects since it reflects on the
allocation  of external resources  received, the internal  and external  transfers necessary  to service
the debt claims, the sovereign  risk aspects, the destination  of capital, etc. The most important
difference  will be the fact that public debt involves an external as well as an internal transfer
(positive  as well as negative)  while private-to-private  claims involve  only an external transfer.
This is important  since the benefits  and costs of public  external financing  are allocated  through
the internal transfer.
H.  Type and Source of Capital
The two forms of finance  differ in the type and source of capital in three ways:
First,  TF  has been provided in  limited forms over  the  last  several decades. Of
overwhelming  importance  has been general-obligation  (i.e., debt) finance.  Sovereign debt is
usually  lower cost and involves  a large degree of control by the borrower.  B1ut  it implies little
risk-sharing between lenders and borrower and little incentives  for selecting and monitoring
projects. The size of  debt owed to  international commercial banks in  the  early  1980s
dramatically highlighted how risks could be concentrated within a  small group of financial10
institutions  and pose a serious threat to the stability of the international  financial  system.
Second, TF largely involves only a transfer of capital whereas AF often involves a
transfer of capital combined with technology, know-how, goods, human capital, etc. 24 This
package can greatly influence  the expected rate of return for the investor and the country.
Third, if capital markets are imperfect  in the country providing the capital, the type of
external finance can depend on  which sector generates the  savinoO. 25 With imperfectly
functioning  capital markets in the developed  countries, for example, FDl may depend on the
amount of savings  generated  internally in (multinational)  firms.
m.  Purptse of Capital Transfer
'TF and AF differ according to the final purpose of the capital transfer, i.e.,  project or
expenditure  financed. The distinction  arises in part from the difference  in the borrower (private
versus public)  and the associated  objective  function  used when evaluating  investments.  Whereas
public investments (TF) can in:ude  projects where economic rates of return are high but
financial rates of return are low (infrastructure,  education), private investment (AF) will be
directed to projects where financial  rates ,  returns are high.
IV.  Links Among  Capital Providers  and Among  Capital Receivers
The links amon, the providers of TF are more explicitly  defined. For example, commercial
banks'  syndication agreements, which cover a  large share of debt financing to  sovereign
borrowers, include sharing clauses  which entitle each lender to an equal share of any payment
received by any syndicate member.  Such clauses achieve a uniform class of creditors and
reinforce a high degree of cohesiveness  among  lenders.  Moreover, projects financed  with TF
are linked through  the internal transfer associated  with a sovereign  claim, putting all TF claim
holders  on the same status. AF claims  holders seldom  treat failure to honor one claim as default
on other claims (according  to contractual  obligations). The degree of interdependence  among
capital providers  and receivers is created by AF is thus considerably  different compared to the
interdependence  creited by TF.
V.  Links between  Projects  and Capital Providers.
The rate of return on the project ultimately  financed  bears virtually  no relationship  to the
interest/return  on the capital for TF.  In AF, however, the relationship  is usually close, or, as
I  This package content of AF will especially be true for FDI and project finance, but equity portfolio
investments  and non-  g- ranteed debt will also have some externalities.
'  The word imperfect  only means that there exit barriers, some of which are institutional  and artificial, other
which are natunl  (such as an asymmetry  of information),  that prevent a perfect mobile flow of capital among
intermediaries  in the developed  world and an equalization  of expected  rates of return across  countries.11
Lessard  (1986) has called it, the foreign  managerial  penetration  is high. This concerns not only
situations  of default, but also the more general incentive  of the capital provider to assure that
the project financed is a success.12
4.  FACTORS DETERMNING  CAPITAL FLOWS:  TRADITIONAL VERSUS
ALTERNATIVE  FORMS  OF EXTERNAL  FINANCE
Why do creditors and borrowers choose AF?  And how do these reasons differ from
those that make them choose TF?  Capital flows across borders because it helps borrowers and
lenders: 26
a) Enhance income over time;
b) Accelerate  or decelerate  income and consumption  over time; and
c) Transfer risks (income  across circumstances).
Smooth,  accelerate  or decelerate  income  or consumption  objective  involves  the building
up of debt or  reserves in response to anticipated movements  in income over time (see for
instance  Cooper and Sachs (1985)). This can be compared  to accumulating  debt or reserves by
individuals  over their lifetime  in accordance  with the permanent  income  or lifecycle  hypotheses.
TF makes this possible through the accumulation  and decumulation  of debt and reserves.  A
good part of the borrowing  during the 1970s  was probably  motivated  by a need to accelerate  and
smooth consumption (often in association with commodity booms).  When viewed ex-post,
however, borrowings appeared to have been more procyclical than countercyclical  and little
smoothing  was accomplished.
The transfer  of risks from developing  countries  to developed  capital markets  (c) has only
recently received attention  as a key objective  of capital flows.'  TF is ill equipped to insure
debtors and creditors  against risk. 28 AF may be better equipped  to do so--given  its contingent
payment obligations--and  in that way may avoid some of the welfare and deadweight losses
associated  with fluctuating  incomes  and postponed  investment  decisions. 29
Developing  countries have sought capital inflows primarily because they wished to
increase their permanent  income. 30 This requires that developing  countries possess investment
2 See for instance  Lessard  (1985).
2 This is also what motivates  capital flows among developed countries.  Even though the advantages  of
international  diversification  of finance  had been pointed  out before (in the finance  literature),  only recently has the
interest of financial  markets in international  diversification  increased  and have market participants in developed
countries  diversified  their financial  holdings  among  developed  countries  on a larger scale on this account.
28  The  general properties  of consumption  smoothing  contracts  are  derived  in, among  others, Kletzer (1989)  and
Kletzer,  Newberry  and Wright  (1990). An interpretation  of these  contracts  in financial  instruments  often  results in
a combination  of existing  financial  instruments  (indexed  contracts,  loans, options)  and sometimes  new instruments.
Since  these  analyses  have  been  done in the context  of a representative  agent  model, no distinction  was made  between
public  and private  obligations.  For an analysis  of the optimal  contract  in a model  with risk sharing and moral  hazard
see Atkenson  (1988).
29Under  certain  circumstances,  an increase  in uncertainty  will lead  investors  to postpone  investments  (see  further
Serven  and Solimano  (1991a  and 1991b)).
3 See, for instance,  Fishlow 1990.13
opportunities  profitable  by world standards which together exceed the availability  of domestic
savings. TF as well as AF is  ised for this purpose. We will in the remainder  conc%..  ate on
this issue of profitable  investment  opportunities. 31
Four types of factors affect the profitability  of investment  opportunities  in developing
countries:
I)  Real factors in the capital receiving  (i.e., host) country;
II)  Real factors  which  arise from the interaction  between  the host  country and
the capital provider;
III)  Government  policies  in the host or source country; and
IV)  Sovereign  risks factors.
For TF the research has largely concentrated  on factors  I) and IV). We will see that for
AF factors II) as well as III) also affect flows, but have not been researched thoroughly.
1.  Real Factors in the Host Country
For capital to flow across borders, the risk-adjusted  real rate of return in the capital
receiving  country must be higher than in the capital providing  country. 32 The higher rate of
return can be due to a number of reasons. These could include different factor endowments--
lower wage costs, more natural resources, lower transportation costs, lower initial physical
capital stock, lower initial human capital stock, etc.  According to  neo-classical theory,
differences in  factor endowments are  required to  make an initial transfer of  resources a
sustainable strategy (sustainable  in terms of satisfying some specific solvency constraint). 33
Such external financing was used, for example, by the U.S.  for building the transcontinental
railroads  in the late 19th  century, by West-European  countries  after WWII, by Brazil in the mid-
1960s  to develop  its export-oriented  industry, by many of the South-East  Asian countries  in the
1970s  and in general underlies  lending  by development  agencies  (see further  for instance  Lessard
(1986) and (1988)).
Recent  work on trade stresses  increasing  returns to scale as a motivating  factor for trade,
which can thus also be a motivating factor behind capital flows. Some of the most recent
contributions  in this area have focussed  on the role of intermediate  goods as a mechanism  for
31  Some  have  called the transfers  of resources  on account  of higher rates  of return also  a desire for consumption
smoothing,  not in light of anticipated  or unanticipated  exogenous  movements  in incomes, but in light of profitable
current investment  oppoitunities.
32 Note that it is usually presumed  in the sovereign  lending literature  that the rate of return is larger in the
developing  country, rather than explicitly  argued for on the basis of development  process and/or relative factor
endowment.  For AF, in particular FDI, the concentration  has often been exactly on defining  the reasons for the
higher rate  of return. Risk, which  will play an important  role, will be treated separately  later. For the moment  we
consider  the expected  rates  of return only.
I  The literature  addressing  the issues in this area is voluminous  (see Jones and Kenen  (1988), WDR 1985  and
WDR 1991).14
transferring "know-how" to developing countries (Grossman and Helpman (forthcoming)).
Similarly, the "endogenous"  growth literature has stressed factors contributing  to growth other
than physical capital,  e.g.  human capital, trade  in  intermediate goods,  and  externalities
associated  with physical investments  (Easterly  and Wetzel (1989)). The full implications  of the
endogenous  growth literature for examining  external capital flows has yet to be explored fully
(see Spiegel (1989) and Arrau (1990) for some initial work).  In particular,  it needs to be
explored  in more detail as to why capital, technology  and other factors may not flow to their
most productive  usage.4
a)  Determinants of Investments.
Many of the factors that determine  the real return for foreign investors also determine
the real rate of  return for domestic private investors. 35 For example, factors, such as the
macroeconomic  environment, the credibility of exchange rate policies, the quality of  fiscal
policies  and the interaction  between  public  and private investment,  can be equally important  for
domestic  as well as foreign investors  (see Serven and Solimano  (199la), Green and Villanueva
(1990)  and Shariff (1990)).
There will, however, be some factors such as exchange  rate policies, that could affect
private domestic  investment  and foreign  private investment  differently.  Other factors include
regulations  regarding the share foreign investors can take in domestic firms, rules governing
remittances  of interest and dividends, performance  requirements  (e.g., on the domestic input
content), and transfer pricing rules.'
General overviews  of the influence  of these factors on foreign private flows are IMP
(1985) and Lizondo (1990). We will focus here on two issues that deserves some special
attention: the link between external and internal financial intermediation;  and the distinction
betveen economic  and financial  rates of return.
b)  External  and Domestic  Financial  Internediation.
The efficiency  and development  of a host country's financial  system can have important
34 The work on endogenous  growth has been able to identify  different  factors contributing  to growth and the
work may challenge  the hypothesis  that, in the absence  of any barriers or frictions  to cross-border  capital flows
(including  any informational  problems  and sovereign  risk factors), capital will flow towards the country  with the
higher rate of return until eventually  rates of return are equalized.  Spiegel (1990) has found, for instance, that in
an endogenous  growth model it may require a critical mass of foreign  borrowings to reap these higher rates of
return.
M The fact that the factors determining  the real rate are the same for both does not make the relative
attractiveness  of investing  for the capital short and capital abundant  the same.
3' In addition,  many (developing)  countries  have  used specifically  designed  incentive  schemes  to attract foreign
investors.  These factors  will be discussed  further below  in the section  on nominal factors.15
implications  for extemal financing.  It appears, for example, that domestic  financial  development
often precedes  a larger inflow of AF.  Korea, Turkey and Indonesia,  which recently liberalized
their domestic  financial  systems,  have seen a larger inflow  of AF accompanied  by foreign  banks
locating  in the country and providing  intermediation  services.3 Brazil, which has had a more
developed  domestic  financial  system,  has attracted  AF earlier on. Recent  flows of AF have gone
to investments  in financial  intermediation  services  (and real estate), as in the case of South-East
Asia.  These flows have been, in part, responses  to the opening of the domestic  banking sector
to foreign investments. 3"
Only a few research papers have formally investigated  linkages between the forms of
external  financial  flows  and the host country's institutional  (financial)  structure. They have  built
on new research on the linkages between  the real and financial  sector in a domestic  context (fol
the latter see for instance  Bernanke  and Gertler (1983)  and Gertler (1988)). One such paper is
Froot and Stein (1991), which focuses on the link between the structure of financial systems
(asymmetry  in information)  and forms of external finance (FDI) and provides evidence  that the
form of cross-border investment  is affected  by exchange  rate changes. 39
Reverse  linkage between net external  capital flows and domestic  financial  systems  is, of
course, through capital flight. The relatively ill-developed  domestic financial systems in some
Latin American  countries  are often mentioned  as a reason behind the large amounts of capital
flight (see for instance  Lessard  and Williamson  (1987)). Other linkages are also likely to exist,
as the extensive literature on the financial  flows among developed  countries shows (i.e., the
models of exchange rate determination, interest parity, purchasing power parity, monetary
policy, etc.). The important  point is that domestic  capital in many developing  countries is (or
will become)  internationally  mobile  and that international  capital has become  more mobile,  both
of which will impose restrictions  on the domestic financial system and made certain types of
external finance more attractive.'0
37This  excludes  FDI in large  mineral  extraction  projects (e.g. oil) which  is largely  independent  of the domestic
institutional  structure. Indonesia  for instance  has used sophisticated  external financial  contracts  for the exploration
of its petroleum  reserves, whereas it had at the time a relatively  undeveloped  domestic  financial  system.
38  It is unclear however,  whether this opening  up of the domestic  banking sector has resulted in facilitating  a
transfer  of foreign  capital  beyond the initial  investment  in the sector and whether  the traditional  theories  developed
for FDI are applicable  to this form of FDI t3o.
3  Tbey  focus  on the informational  asymmetries  involved  in international  capital flows. They conjecture  that the
increase  in FDI in the USA in recent years by Japanese  investors  may be associated  with the appreciation  of the
Yen which has made their wealth higher measured in dollars and allowed them to overcome some borrowing
constraints  (which  arose because  of asymmetries  in information).  Since they postulate  that asymmetric  information
is more prevalent  with FDI than with portfolio  investment,  the effect of the appreciation  of the Yen during the
period 1985-1988  was expected  to be the strongest  on FDI flows  (in particular  those directed at real estate). In that
way the form of exteral  finance (FDI) was dependent  on the structure of the financial  system (asymmetry  in
information).
4' One way to look at this is as a portfolio  problem  of both foreign  and domestic investos. and derive their
preferred asset and liability  stock positions.16
c)  Economic versus Fmancial Rates of Return.
TF and AF are often used to finance different purposes.  AF is more limited in scope
because both financial  and economic  rates of return need to be high. 41 A drop in TF and an
increased reliance on AF may therefore profoundly affect development  processes.  This has
important  implications.  Official  lending  should  be directed  towards  projects  with high economic,
but low financial  rates of return (education,  health, environment,  infrastructure),  and AF could
be used, if available, to finance  project with high economic  and high financial  rates of return
(say in energy, manufacturing  and industry). 42
H.  Real Factors Arising from Iteraction between Debtor and Creditor
Interaction  between debtor and creditor may influence  the rate of return on the project.
For example, Multinational  Corporations  (MNCs) may decide to invest abroad to gain access
to protected  markets. 43 Interaction  between  creditors  and debtors also lead to gains in efficiency.
We will focus here on: a) the interaction through the MNC and b) the issue of managerial
control and source of financing.
a)  Interaction through the hNC
MNCs transfer technology  and help  diversify risks for its shareholders. We distinguish
between two perspectives  on the role of the MNC: an economics  and a finance perspective.
Economic Perspective. In general,  the economics  literature  tries to explain the decisions
of multinationals  on where  to invest resources, source inputs  and produce outputs, and also the
existence  of intra-sectoral,  intra-firm  and intra-industry  trade (see Graham  and Krugman  (1990)).
The c,onclusion  that emerges is that economies  of scale and scope, the factor content of foreign
trade, the benefits of (vertical)  integration  offered by the multinational,  the market structure  in
which the firm operates, and other dimensions  which  come along with the providers of AF (the
transfer of non-tangibles  between different  plants) can be important  factors in determining the
total return and motivation for cross-border flows. The literature is still somewhat weak on
issues  like why price-collusion  is an imperfect  substitute  for a multiplant  firm, and why portfolio
4'  Of course, economic  rates of return are not necessarily  as high as the financial rates of return. At the
opposite, much attention has been given in the past to the possibility  that FDI would amount to a  form of
exploitation  of countries and financial  rates of return to private  investors  would  exceed  economic  rates of return.
I  In addition to economic  versus financial  rates of return, there is the issue of extemalities  across borders
(enviromment)  which requires a different  form of finance. We will not discuss this here.
I  It is interesting  to note in this context that several developing  countries which  had successful  development
processes in the 1970s  and 1980s  which were financed  in part by public external debt, have only very recently
moved away from public  borrowing  towards  altemative  forms  of external finance. Possibly,  the move away from
public external finance  came only when investments  with high economic,  but low financial  rates  of return were
mwade,  and high economic  as well as financial  rate of return projects remained.  Had these countries allowed for
private  borrowings  earlier  on, then  government  extemal  borrowings  may  have  been crowded  out and high  economic,
low financial  rates of return projects  would  not have been realized.17
investments  (without  managerial  control), exporting, leasing,  joint ventures or licensing  cannot
perform the same functions  as foreign  investment.
What the literature does not explain well is why foreign investment is triggered by
differences in  factor endowment and market structures that happen to coincide with  legal
boundaries between countries. The literature has often identified multiplant  with multicountry
locations. This can only be correct if sovereig-.  boundaries determine locational advantage.
Krugman (1991) indeed stresses that this literature has been  much more a  literature of
geographic  location  of industries  across regions (as for instance  across regions within the USA)
than of investments  across sovereign  boundaries. The answer that barriers to factor movements
and market  imperfections  likely  coincide  with country  limits  does not answer the question  of why
countries  find it in their (mutual)  interest to erect these barriers.44  The sovereignty  of countries
itself--defined  in the broadest sense  as an inability  to enter binding  agreements--may  be a logical
explanation  for erecting  barriers and thus creating locational  advantages.  This sovereign  factor
as a reason for foreign investment--and  not (just) as a constraint--has  received little research
attention.
In general, the research in this area may have had more impact on the behavior of
multinational  firms--how  they can benefit from these factor and market imperfections--and  little
impact on promoting AF. 45 There exists an urgent need to translate this literature into policy
advice--regarding  domestic market structures, regulations, etc.--to achieve investments which
are advantageous  to both the multinational  firm and the host country.  Countries  need to know
which type of policies lead to AF flows that "exploit" the imperfections  in a way that benefits
their own development  process as well as that of the multinational  firms.
Finance Perspective. The finance literature has stressed the benefits of the MNC in
terms of  diversifying risks  for  its shareholders. To  the  extent that  shareholders cannot
(efficiently)  diversify their portfolios  (growth stakes) in other companies  or countries but the
MNC can, foreign investments  by the MNC can lead to welfare and efficiency  gains for the
shareholders. This will of course be especially  true if MNCs acquire or use non-traded goods
which individuals  cannot. For example, an MNC could acquire human  capital by buying up a
company  with high technological  skills  and use it productively,  something  an individual  would
find impossible.
Errunza and Senbet (1981) broaden this diversification  perspective  by investigating  the
existence  of monopoly  rents associated  with international  operations  due to imperfections  in all
4 Restrictions  in labor  mobility  seem  the  most  clearly  drawn  along  sovereign  lines  (understandably  so), but  does
not seem a sufficient locational advantage to explain all  foreign investment. Tax differentials and product
differentiation  are often mentioned as a  motivation for foreign investment. The first follows directly from
sovereignty  and the second  does not require foreign  investment.
I It is in this sense  disconcerting  to note  that in text  books  on foreign  investment  for managers  the imperfections
are often mentioned  as sources  of ex-ante positive  present  value projects, and not the efficiency  gains that can be
generated.18
markets (product, factor, financial and differential international taxation). They show that
empilically there  exists a  systematic positive relationship between the  current  degree of
international  involvement  and excess market value, even after adjusting  for risk diversification
benefits.
b)  Managerial Control  and Capital Structure
It was pointed out earlier that AF fosters closer managerial control by  the foreign
investor.'  There are two possibilities: those cases of AF where the claimholder takes on
(some  of) the additional  functions  of manager  (majority  and/or minority  stakes);  and those  cases
where the managers  are not the claimholders.
Where foreign investors  are also the managers,  they are usually in  !  J closely on the
selection of the project and in sovereign risk evaluation.  As managers of the project, they
ensure access to capital and export markets. 4 ' This high level of managerial  control can have
important implications  for the amounts of financing  sustainable  since it releases an important
incentive  compatibility  constraint, that is, the constraint imposed by the knowledge  that, once
funds are disbursed, the borrower's incentives  to invest may be different than claimed before
(see for example Aizenman  and Borenzstein  (1989)  and Claessens and Diwan (1990)).48
If  the  foreign investor is  not  the  manager, but  is  directly concerned about  the
performance of the project, the issue of managerial  cmntrol  will arise. The (implicit) capital
structure  of the firm then  affects the incentive  of the managers.  The issue of managerial  control
has received  considerable  attention  in the domestic  corporate finance literature. 49 This "modern
theory of the firm", which calls the complete  set of contracts  (labor, suppliers,  distributors,  etc.)
a firm, draws the attention to the different factors that efficiently  monitor the performance  of
managers  and the discipline  that the market for managerial  services  puts on the managers (see
further Fama (1980) and Jensen and Meckling  (1976)).
The research done on capital structure in a closed economy  can provide some insights
on the optimal  financing  (or participation)  modes  of an international  firm once one incorporates
cointry risk by adjusting  the principal  agent model used in sovereign  debt analysis. Neither the
corporate finance nor the sovereign  debt literature are directly applicable  to analyze the capital
structure  of an international  firm.  The scope for principal  agent and moral hazard problems  is
I' Close  linkages,  and associated  forms  of risks  sharing,  should  be distinguished  from pledging  or collatelizing
assets of future receivables  for the purp  jse of attracting  external finance. The latter may necessary to overcome
some creditworthiness  constraint, however,  it does not need to affect the incentives  of the manager.
47  This aspect of managerial  control is thus beyond the value of nanagerial know-how  as an input to the
production  process  and as a motivation  for foreign  investment.
48 However,  the fact that  the MNC acts  as the manager  of the subsidiary,  of course  does not mean  that the MNC
will necessarily  manage  the subsidiary  in the interest of the MNC's shareholders.  It can  just move the managerial
problem  one layer up.
49  The literature  got a major  impulse  from the article by Jensen and Meckling  (1976). For a recent overview
see Dreyfuss  and Knopf (1988).19
even larger in an international  context than in a domestic  context, especially  since international
liability is  poorly defined.  Yet, the  representative  agent model used in  the literature on
sovereign  debt will not be applicable  given the decentralized  borrowing  and repayment  decisions
and the possible  externalities  generated  by private-to-private  financing.
c)  The nature of international  liability  and the social benchmark  of investment.
International  laws and practice  on the nature  and extent  of foreign  claimholders'  liabilities
are often vague and at best ill-defined. The ill-defined nature of  international liability will
influence the investment as  well as  the financing decision. In general, the private foreign
financier will have an incentive to lay off some costs on the host society. The move to more
market-oriented  economies  has reduced  the possibilities  of foreign  investors  exploiting  distortions
in domestic markets.  But it has not overcome the problem generic to  all limited liability
investors. Limited  liability  firms can adopt excessively  risky strategies with potentially  adverse
consequences  for the country. In domestic  firms, another stakeholder  (e.g., labor) may prevent
this behavior.  But in case of international  investments,  no similar counterweight  may exist.
Furthermore, the nature of international  contracts is such that a borrower can default
selectively  on claims incurred for one project and dilute  the value of existing  claims by incurring
new obligations. With TF the borrower cannot create different classes among its lenders. 50
This difference affects the amount of AF that can be borrowed. The nature of international
claims  also makes the relative  ranking  of claims uncertain,  (this issue is most clear in the relative
seniority  of debt and equity  claims), further  complicating  the managerial  control function  of the
capital structure  of a firm.3'
The rate of return on an investment is sensitive to the capital structure when AF is
involved.  This is because AF lacks sharing clauses. Conflicts between different classes of
claimholders  can arise.  As a result, profitable investments  may not be undertaken in some
cases, especially  when the yield is not sufficient  to service all outstanding  claims in all states of
nature. 52
50  Similar  to domestic  corporate  finance,  the ability  of a borrower  to create  multiple  classes of claims  and to
make  existing  claimholders  junior  to new claimbolders  will diminish  the  attractiveness  of lending  to that  borrower
in the first  place and  lower the  total supply of funds  available.  In domestic  context  clauses  prevent  the borrower
from  doing  so.
1' An analogy  exists  here  with the  effectiveness  of 'me-first'  and  other  priority  rules  in bankruptcy  courts  in
domestic  finance  (see for instance  Smith  and Warner  (1978)). There  restrictions  used in contracts  to limit the
conflicts  among  different  classes  of bondholders  and  between  bondholders  and  stockholders  are  fitted  in  the  literature
on corporate  control,  and  are  derived  in an endogenous  fashion.  Restrictions  in a domestic  context  most  often  take
the  form  of restrictions  on dividend  and  financing  policy  and  nct  on production  or investment  decisions.  Possibly,
deriving  an endogenous  seniority  structure  could  be also done  in an international  context.
I This line of reasoning  was first  used by Myers  (1977) when  discussing  the effects of corporate  borrowings
on a firm's investment  policies. He showed that the existence  of preferred claims weakens  the incentives  of the
shareholders  of a  firm to undertake good investment  opportunities.  With complete sharing clauses, the claim
strub.ture  is homogenous  and  conflicts among different classes about investment  policies cannot arise. Conflicts20
So far these aspects has only been explored to a  limited extent. John, Senbet and
Sundaram  (1990)  show that limited  liability  leads to globalization  of benefits and localization  of
subsidies.  Eun and Janakiramanan  (1990)  show that the value of a partly internationally  owned
firm depends  on the share of foreign ownership  and that foreign  and domestic shareholders  do
not act as an alliance  to maximize  the value of the firm.  Hodder and Senbet (1990) show that
in case  of integrated  international  financial  markets the agency costs of debt financing  determine
an optimal  capital  structure  for an internationally  operating  firm  which is fundamenta.1y  different
from what the traditional  corporate capital structure literature would predict. Both the implicit
nature of contracts and the more varied types of claims can lead to more restrictions (on
managers)  in international  contracts.
What really is required here is either the endogenous  derivation  of tht optimal liability
structure or an investigation  of what existing (exogenous)  financial instruments  imply for an
international  firm competing  for capital. The first approach has the advantage  of being able to
work along the lines of the optimal  contract in the principal-agent  framework  used in corporate
finance  and sovereign  debt analysis. However,  its interpretation  in terms of existing instruments
becomes difficult. The second approach is generally  used for domestic corporate finance and
may more easily be adapted to an international  context. From a policy point of view, what is
important  is whether the market place can adjust the capital structure of the firm in a way that
leads to maximization  of the value of the firm as well as an investment  level which is efficient
from the point of view of the host country.
d)  Financial  Intermediation  in the Developed  World.
Closely  related to the issues  of managerial  control and capital structure  is the availability
of resources in the different  sectors  and institutions  of source countries. The dominance  of bank
lending  in the 1970s  was, for instance,  associated  with he large amounts  of oil dollars recycled
through  the banking  system to developing  countries. It has become  clear that commercial  banks,
by nature, do not have the institutional  setup and comparative  advantage  to intermediate  capital
with long maturities. Conceivably,  these capital transfers could have been intermediated  first
(directly  or indirectly)  in the source countries  to multinational  firms which could have "added"
their technology  and other skills  and then have invested  in developing  countries. Apparently  the
institutional structures and  arrangements in  developed and  developing countries did  not
encourage such a possibility. 53 Similarly, the increase in foreign investment in the 1980s by
Japanese  firms has, among  others, been  associated  with an increase  in business savings  in Japan,
whereas total Japanese savings did not change much or even declined.
If financial  intermediation  is imperfect  in developed  countries (i.e., managerial  control
problems  become  too large), the availability  of AF for developing  countries  will depend on the
between claimholders  and countrv can still arise of course, since in some sense the country is the ultimate
shareholder.
13  See Goldborough  (1979), Oman (1984) and IMF (1985).  See also the WDR (1985), especially  chapter 6,
for an analysis  of the interaction  between  institutional  arrangements  in developed  countries  and type  of capital  flows.21
availability  of capital at the relevant sources.'  Institutional  investors, such as pension funds
and insurance  funds, have been identified  as an important  new source of capital since they have
long term investment  horizons  and could  develop the ability to monitor  and manage  projects (see
Lessard  and Williamson  (1985)). However, it is not clear why investments  by these investors
directly is preferred to intermediating  funds from these institutions  to MNCs, which  then would
invest in developing  countries. It is that intermediation,  first to MNCs and then to developing
countries, increases the managerial  control problem--and  consequently  direct intermediation  is
preferred--or  can one design contracts  between  the MNC and the final lender which  exploits the
informational  and other advantages of  the MNC while minimizing the  managerial control
problem?" It is  in any case clear that the international firm plays an  important financial
intermediation  role, which has not been stressed to date.i 6
e)  Effects on the Balance of Payments.
Multinational firms investing both in  the country where their parent companies are
located and in countries where their affiliates operate, raise funds globally to finance fixed
capital  investment  expenditures  and other operations. Their capital expenditure  decisions  affect
total capital  fo:mation  in the developing  countries  where  affiliates  are located,  and their financial
decisions  influence  the external asset position  of source and host countries. The intercompany
flow of funds between parent and affiliate  companies  are recorded in the balance of payments
of both countries  and they are influenced  by conditions  in financial  markets in industrial  nations,
as well as the degree of development  of financial  markets  in developing  countries. Taxation of
international  flows of capital, capital  control policies  in the source  countries, and incentives  for
foreign  investment  in the host countries  are further  determinants  of intercompany  flow  of funds.
The literature on financing  and investment  decisions  of multinationals  (see for instance
Senbet (1979)  and Shapiro (1978), and the literature on fund competing  capital expenditure  in
various locations  by multinational  firms (see Lipsey  and Stevens  (1988)) has not yet accounted
for the contribution  of multinationals  in the extemal asset position  of countries. Various studies
in the 1960s and 1970s have examined  foreign direct investment  and the balance of payments
of industrial  countries;  they focused,  however,  mainly  on the Voluntary  Restraint  Program  which
the U.S. launched in February 1965 (see Brimmer (1972), Kwack (1972), Prachowny  (1972),
and Boatwright  and Renton (1975)).
54  Even in the absence  of any transactions  costs, intermediation  can be expected to remain imperfect-in the
sense of not equalizing  expected  rates of return--in  the presence  of asymmetries  in information  between  lender  and
borrower and related moral  hazard problems.
I An interesting  application  of the benefits  of an improvement  of informational  structure  to debt-equity  swaps
is Errunza  and Moreau  (1989)  where, because  the multinational  is better informed  about the investment  project  than
banks, debt-for-equity  swaps  can have some benefits  for all.
I In general, the link between  available  sources  of finance  and the structure  of a developing  country's external
finance  has received little attention. One of the few papers in this area is Husain  and Choi (1990). As a start, it
would be very useful to look at how financial  flows are intermediated  on a worldwide  scale. This could be done
along the lines of a World Accounting  Matrix as discussed  in McCarthy  (1988).22
Balance  of payment  components  for industrial  countries with large direct investment  in
developing  countries (U.S., U.K., Germany, France, and Japan), have seldom been analyzed
chronologically  and linked  to various  policies  affecting  capital  outflows  from industrial  countries
and incentives  for foreign  direct investment  in developing  countries. Lipsey (1987) provides an
analysis of the growth of U.S. direct investment  abroad after World War I."  He describes
the changing  characteristics  of U.S.-owned foreign  operations. He indicates, for example, that
the export orientation  of affiliates  varies by location  as well as by industry. He reports data on
exports as  percent of  sales of  majority owned foreign affiliates located in developed and
developing  countries. Similar analysis of FDI by some other OECD countries with large FDI-
flows (U.K., The Netherlands,  Germany,  France,  Japan) that traces developments  in the balance
of payments  flows has not yet been done.
III.  "Government Policies" in the Host or Source Country.
The third factor which influences  the rate of return to the foreign investor is government
policies in  the host as  well as the source countries.  These policies include subsidies, tax
holidays, differential  tax structures, etc.  Such factors  can alter the level and return of foreign
direct investment. We will discuss  here non-tax  incentive  schemes  and tax treatments  (including
tax incentive  schemes).
a)  Incentive Schemes
Most (developed  and developing)  countries have had at least one policy instiument in
place which has raised the expected profit for foreign investors." 8 The impact of specific
incentives  in developing  countries for attracting foreign direct investment flows is uncertain,
however.  Many studies suggest that incentives, and  especially those that involve future
promises, are largely ignored by investors. Guisinger  et al. (1985)  suggest that incentives  play
a  relatively minor role in  location decisions. 59 Other considerations (general investment
climate) frequently rank above incentives. Host country sector specific policies are  more
important  in influence  allocation  decisions  of foreign  investors. Non-tax  distortions introduced
by schemes in source countries, such as insurance on outward-foreign  investment, could also
influence  investors  when deciding  where to locate (see Gubitz (1991)).
There appears to be some (largely  anecdotal)  evidence that host-country  policies  which
involve large upfront payments  are effective  in attracting foreign  investment.  But it is unclear
I Detailed  data and yearly  developments  for the U.S. are described  in the Survey  of Current Business.
I  Guisinger,  in Moran (1986), provides  a classification  of incentives  and disincentives.
59 It is the relatively  attractiveness  of the incentive  scheme  that matters, where relative  is defined  with respect
to other countries. This opens the possibility  of rounds of competitive  bidding  with no change of a country's
relative  share of total capital flows,  but increasing  benefits  of the investors.  Wheeler  and Mody (1990)  analyze  this
and find that in generml  'tournaments" for foreign investment  are unnecessary  and largely benefit the foreign
investor.  There  is an important  role for an intemational  organization  in curtailing  incentives  (and  some of its is done
through  the United  Nations  Center on Transnational  Corporations),  however,  this effort hinges  on some mechanism
to enforce agreements.23
what the final  economic  benefits  are for the host. Shapiro  (1990), for instance, analyzes  the case
of the automobile  industry in Brazil where state intervention  led to the establishment  of the
domestic  industry. She  concludes  that  in this  particular  case the intervention  had been successful.
Warr (1989) studies whether export-processing  zones attract foreign investment.  He finds,
however, that they do so but yield uncertain  economic  benefits  to the host country; the up-front
costs can be substantial  and the economic  spillover  effects appear minimal.
b)  Tax Treatments
Differences in tax structures and changes in tax structures alone do  not explain a
significant  fraction  of the capital flows  experienced  among  developed  countries in recent years.
For developing  countries,  research  results  are mixed. Auerbach  (1990)  presents  some  theoretical
analysis, with a focus on developing  countries  and finds that tax structures  can be important.
Slemrod (1990) concludes that the influences  of differential tax regimes are not that easy to
quantify.'  Shah and Slemrod (1990) find that FDI flows to  Mexico are  sensitive to  the
Mexican  and U.S. tax regimes. Similar results  are found by Jun (1990)  for FDI to and from the
US, Froot (1990) for FDI from Japan, Froot and Stein (1990) for FDI from Japan to the US,
Leechor and Mintz (1990) for the case of Thailand, and Mintz (1990).
Tax treatments, however, not only affect (gross) capital flows, but also investment,
expenditures, and the type of  financing  decisions. Huizinga has found that international  tax
competition  affects foreign  investment  incentives,  and that tax treatment  by national authorities
affects  R&D  expenditures  and product-innovating  activities  (Huizinga  1990a, forthcoming  c, and
1989a).  Tax regimes may also play an important  role in the type  of cross-border  flows, as in the
determination  of the debt-equity ratio for individual  firms in a country once the investment
decision has been made (see, for instance, Huizinga (forthcoming  a) and Errunza and Senbet
(1981)). Hodder and Senbet (1990), however, derive the international  analogy to Miller's debt
and taxes  equilibrium  model  and find that corporate tax policy  plays  a key role in generating  an
intemational  capital structure, but does not affect the capital structure decisions of individual
firms.
The main conclusion from the analysis of different  government  policies attract foreign
investors  is that they have  only limited  effect, especially  when incentives  can easily and without
much cost be withdrawn  or reduced by the host country. 6'
IV. Country Risk Factors
° An article which includes capital flows among developed as well as between developed and developing
countries is Frankel and MacArthur  (1988). This article  concludes  that there is a high degree of capital mobility
among  OECD  countries,  and that  for other  countries,  with  political  risks premiums,  expected  currency  depreciations
explain interest differentials  and financial  markets  are well integrated.
"I Grieco (1985) reports for instance that the tax rate on investments  in the natural resource projects had
increased  by as much as 30 percentage  points  with several years after the initial  investment  agieement.24
The fourth factor that influences  the level and pattern of international  capital flows is
country risk.  Before .ransferring  capital, lenders  needs assure themselves  that debtors can and
will repay.  Penalties need to dissuade  default, and good reputations  need to be rewarded. The
absence of an international  bankruptcy  court (and no modern equivalent  of gunboat diplomacy)
implies  that penalties  are difficult  to impose  and reputations  are even more difficult  to establish.
For TF, sovereign  risks was for the first time explored  in an analytical  model by Eaton
and Gersovitz  (1981). They concentrate  on the incentive for the borrower to retain access to
international  financial  markets and in that way focus on the intertemporal  costs of defaulting.
This strand of the literature is surveyed by Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986) and Eaton
(1990). Bulow and Rogoff (1989a, 1989b  and 1989c) have stressed the importance  of direct
penalties, such as trade sanctions,  that lenders  can impose  in cases of default.  The weakness
of most of these sovereign  risk models  is that they  do not consider the tradeoff between  different
constituencies  in the debtor country.
The relative empirical importance  of each of the factors for determining  ex-ante capital
flows  to and ex-post transfers  from sovereign  borrowers  is still largely unknown,  however.  This
means  that the exact nature  of the implicit  contract  between  lenders  and borrowers is not known,
which imposes severe limitations on the kind of policy advice one can give regarding the
contractual  forms of the contracts  that achieve  a first-best  outcome
For AF, country  risk has received  less attention  in the analytical  and empirical  literature.
Lessard (1988 and 1989)  and Lessard and Williamson  (1985) have identified  why country risk
in AF differs from a public  debt contract.  These include: internal  transfers are absent; default
(opportunistic)  is defined differently  (in cases of foreign investment  default can be partial and
the result of exogenous shocks, actions by the government or a deliberate decision by the
borrower); the project being financed  may  differ; the deadweight  losses associated  with default
may be different (which ch3nges  the incentives  to renegotiate);  and the relative importance  of
AF has been less, possibly lowering default risk.  We will focus on three issues:  selective
expropriation  and reputation; assumption  of private claims; and analytical modelling.
a)  Selective  Expropriation  and Reputation
In most cases, private foreign  investors  have few or no links among  each other, whereas
sovereign lending banks typically have strong links. This means that a threat to stop lending
would be more effective when made by sovereign lenders.  Private creditors would find it
difficult  to coordinate  among  themselves. But private creditors could withhold technology  and
other inputs, or restrict future access to internationally  developed  know-how.
The absence  of links among  private creditors  makes it easier for borrowers to default  on
one individual claimholder as well as default on one individual project (financed by several
lenders who also finance other projects). This tends to influence  the nature of the penalty for
default and thus the implicit contract between borrower and lender (see, further, Eaton and
Gersovitz 1984).  For example, borrowers are likely to default on those projects where the25
penalties  are the smallest. Also, the host  country  government  can evaluate the economic  benefits
and costs of defaulting  on an individual  project separately, and make the expropriation  decision
with respect to one creditor or one project alone.
Picht  and  Stuven (19b8) suggest, however, that  governments seldom selectively
expropriate,  but instead  expropriate  across all sectors and industries. This is irrational  from an
economic  point of view, since costs and benefits of expropriation  are not equal across sectors
and industries.  Unselective  behavior  tends to be based on the "ideology"  of the government,
usually  following  elections  or coups. If that were the case, however,  one would  expect the satne
behavior  of the government  with respect  to debt obligations. Yet "joint" defaults  on both forms
of finance  seems to be rare.  This leaves some scope for substitution  between  TF and AF at the
country level.  Other (anecdotal)  evidence (fur instance, Eaton and Gersovitz (1984)) also
suggests that some countries did expropriate selectively  without  adverse effect on their access
to (other forms of) external capital. 62
This is not to say that there are no elements of spillover  or externalities  between the
credibility  of the different  forms of external  finance (i.e., the perceived  likelihood  that contracts
will be fulfilled  ex-post)  which are important.  In particular, the issue of how a government  can
establish credibility regardiing  all external contracts deserves attention.  There appears, for
example, to be a need for necessary "overshooting"  (incurring an up-front costs) to  gain
credibility  on all external  contracts. Definitely,  domestic  concerns  ("politics")  will influence  the
credibility  of contracts.
It should  also be noted here that expropriation  occurs along a continuum  of policies  that
affect the ex-post return on investment. Creeping expropriation, acting on the earnings of a
foreign  investment,  in the form of taxation,  the negative  influence  of unions,  domestic  ownership
requirements,  etc., is hard to detect and it may be difficult therefore to measure expropriation
in a correct way.  Examples of some analytical work in this area are Huizinga (1990c and
1990b). He investigates  the impact  of labor unions  on foreign  investment  patterns and find that
these could negatively  influence  foreign investment.
b)  Assumption  of Private  Claims
Assumption  of extemal claims of a private borrower by the government in cases of
default of the private borrower has occurred frequently.  The governments of many Latin-
American  countries  in the early 1980s were forced (or found it in their interest) to assume the
external liabilities  of private borrowers in their countries.  Chile was typical in this respect.
Presumably, the social costs of default were larger than the costs that could be imposed  on the
private borrower.  Thus, under certain circumstances,  the govemment cuuld be justified in
"bailing  out" private debtors to prevent creditors from imposinig  penalties on the country as a
whole.
'  There is some evidence that especially  expropriation in the extractive industries is  'excused* by other
creditors.26
Little analytical  work has been devoted to this topic so far (one of the few papers is
Eaton (1987)).  Questions that could be explained further:  what are  the benefits to  an
international  organization  for settling investment  disputes  and claims among private entities in
different countries (to prevent foreign creditors to  impose costs such that the public sector
assumes private claims); 63 what is the nature and importance  of domestic property rights and
contract enforcement;  and what is the role of the government in screening  and monitoring  of
private borrowings. The implications are large, since an increase in  future private foreign
investment  without  implicit  or explicit  government  guarantees,  will require a proper enforcement
of contracts, domestically  as well as internationally.  Much may be learned from experiences  of
develeped  countries in enforcing  cross-border  private contracts.
c)  Analytical Modeling of Country Risk
Recognition  of the importance  of country risk in influencing  the level and pattern of AF
can be traced back to at least Vernon  (1971)  (who coined  the phrase "the obsolescing  bargain").
However, only a  few articles have dealt with this using analytical models.  In contrast, it
represents the core element in the literature on TF. Exceptions  are the papers by Eaton and
Gersovitz  (1984 and 1986), Bond and Samuelson  (1986 and 1989), Doyle and van Wijnbergen
(1984), Cole and English  (1988a and 1988b),  Cohen and Michel (1990), Zhu (1990), Thomas
and Worall (1990), and Huiz 1nga (1990b).  These articles investigate  loss of reputation, loss of
technology,  and the credibility  of tax holidays.
Loss of Reputation. Cole and English (1988a)  extend the Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)
analysis of  sovereign reputation to international equity contracts.  Equity contracts require
different repayments  in each state of nature than debt contracts. While the welfare benefits of
future access to the intemational  capital markets  are identical  to those  of debt financing, default
states are different for equity than for debt since the contractual  repayments  are different. Cole
and English  (1988b) extend  their analysis to the case of two-sided sovereign  default where two
countries lhold equity claims on  each other as a  means to  share risks.  T'hey show that
sovereignty  does not prevent agents from holding a completely pooled  portfolio, but prevents
perfect ex-post  risk-sharing  because  of the possibility  of default. Also, individual  investors may
overinvest  in the foreign  country.
Loss of Technology  and Know-How.  Eaton and Gersovitz (1984) discuss the role of
foreign  technology  in sustaining  cross-border  lending. They use a one-period model  and assume
that foreign technology  is made available  at the same moment  the return on foreign capital is
paid, ensuring incentive-compatibility.  They show that foreign technology can allow for a
broader range of contracts. As a result of the one-period setup, however, they are not able to
5 The International  Center for the Settlement  of Investment  Disputes (part of the Bank group) is such an
organization.  So far, little use has been made  of this organization:  11 claims  have been settled so far between  the
two parties and only 9 claims have given rise to awards. There was only one new case in FY1988/89. Another
example of supranational  judicial authority  has been the transfer of the assessment  of customs tariffs to a foreign
firm by some developing  countries  in response  to corruption  in customs  collection  (example  from Eaton (1990)).27
analyze  the dynamic  properties of introducing  technology  in cross-border lending and whether
time-inconsistencies  may  arise when foreign  technology  is made available  before foreign  capital
is repaid.  Cohen and Michel (1990) show that neither a consumption  smoothing  motive (the
original Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) argument), or direct physical sanctions (the Bulow and
Rogoff (1989a)  argument)  are necessary to sustain lending but that withholding  futur  foreign
technology  can be an equilibrium  that is dynamically consistent, i.e.,  neither one of the two
parties finds in its interest to renege at any point in the future. In this way, they extend  the one-
period Eaton and Gersovitz  (1984)  period to an infinite  horizon, perfect bargaining  equilibrium.
The article of Thomas and Worall (1990) is in this spirit too.  Both articles find an important
role for future technology  in sustaining  capital flows.
To the extent that developing countries have no or  little intellectual property right
protection--and  that intellectual  property is vransferrable  and thus expropriable--this  will reduce
or distort foreign investment. Only technology  to be developed  in the future can then serve as
a  deterrent to  expropriation. Especially in light of  the findings of  the endogenous growth
literature, where technology has  spillover effects, preventing transfer of  technology may
therefore have serious consequences  for future growth.
Tax Holidays. Doyle and van Wijnbergen  (1984)  theoretically  show that, after an initial
tax holiday, tax rates are likely to go up to the level where effectively  all the benefits of the
investment  accrue to the host country. Bond and Samuelson  (1986)  suggest  that tax holidays  may
need to be quite generous to attract foreign investment  because they are reversible; otherwise
the tax holiday  may only serve as a signal o; investment  prospects, not as a monetary  incentive.
Huizinga (1990) shows that tax holidays may be a  way for the government to  convey an
otherwise  unobservable  index of its impatience  with the foreign  investor. As foreign  investment
is augmented,  the investor learns about the rate of impatience  of the government,  explaining  the
gradual diminishing  tax holiday (increase in the tax rate).  In general, however, policies that
constitute  the most efficient stimulus  for foreign investment  from the country's point of view,
and at the same time are perceived to be credible promises by the foreign investors, have not
been identified.
Further  Modelling.  There is scope for further analytical  work on what constitutes  a
mutually acceptable, dynamically consistent cross-border private-to-private contract in  the
presence of fixed costs, technology and know-how  transfers and a sovereign enforcing the
contracts. To date, no analytical  model  explains why foreign  investment  does not flow in larger
amounts to a  number of developing countries in the presence of large differences in factor
endowments  and marked  imperfections. The characteristics  of these contracts  should be derived
in a sequential  bargaining  context and concepts  developed  in the literature  on sovereign  lending
(Bulow  and Rogoff  (1989)  and Fernandez  and Rosenthal  (1988))  will offer some  direction here.
The rapidly  developing  literature  on credibility,  commitments  and economic  policies  (see Persson
and Tabellini (1990) for an overview)  will also provide some valuable inputs here.28
5.  SUMMARY
This paper has surveyed  the literature  on external financing  for developing  countries  and
identified  several major gaps in the literature. Important  areas where theoretical  and empirical
contributions  to research on international  financing  could be made are the country risk aspects
of AF; the incentive  structures  for, and restrictions  on, AF; and the optimal  participation  modes
in developing countries by international firms.  The paper also draws implications for the
policies  of official  creditors. The current literature offers little analytical  support regarding  the
preferred  forms of official  creditors' own financial  intermediation  and their possible  support role
for private sector financing  (co-financing,  guarantees,  privatization,  and the achievement  of the
necessary  comfort of adherence  to private-to-private  claims). Without a clear analysis of, for
example, the differences  between  TF and AF, without  knowing  when either form is called for,
or the implicit  seniority  status  of these different  claims, the official  creditors may have difficulty
defining their roles in these areas.
It would be useful therefore to study, analytically  and empirically, the differences in
country risk between TF and AF.  This would help to better assess the type and amounts of
future AF consistent  with an (explicit or implicit) enforcement  of contracts and the necessary
institutional  structure  to assure a proper treatment  of claims. Research  on the issue of incentives
and restrictions  in the host country could focus on the efficiency of these schemes from the
country's perspective  and identify what the best incentive  structures are to attract the desired
volumes and types of  foreign capital. This would help design better policies on domestic
regulations,  taxes, accounting, institutional  structure, and performance  incentives.  Issues like
the appropriateness  of ownership and capital controls, the enforcement of private-to-private
contracts, the monitoring  of external private-to-private  contracts, the decision to allow foreign
banks to enter a country, the design of appropriate  financial  instruments,  and the appropriateness
of investment  incentives  should  be addressed.
Research  on the optimal  participation  modes  in host countries  by international  firms could
focus on the (optimal)  capital structure  of an MNC seeking  financing  from domestic  and foreign
capital markets, under the constraint that capital in the host country is mobile. The research
could investigate  how international  firms should finance (and have been financing)  themselves,
and whether  there have  been shifts in these patterns;  derive  contracts that deal with moral hazard
and sovereign nsk  problems; and discuss the intermediation  role of MNCs and the possible
restrictions  a government  should  impose on private-to-private  financing.
Research in  these areas could assist the World Bank and other official creditors in
defining their role in a world with increased  capital mobility and global capital shortage, and
would be consistent with their own increased emphasis on private sector development. This
would help improve their policy advice, their own efficiency as intermediators, and their
activities vis-a-vis private-to-private  lending. Since these institutions are heavily involved in
policy advice on domestic reforms often largely aimed at attracting foreign finance--either
through developing  appropriate instruments  or by providing the necessary comfort to ensure
adherence to performance requirements at the project level, they cannot afford to duplicate29
systems  in existence  elsewhere  and need to take into account  the specific  situations  of developing
countries.30
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